

## Message Text

UNCLASSIFIED

PAGE 01 MBFR V 00424 01 OF 02 201901Z  
ACTION ACDA-10

INFO OCT-01 EUR-12 ISO-00 ACDE-00 SSO-00 NSCE-00  
INRE-00 CIAE-00 H-02 INR-07 IO-14 L-03 NSAE-00  
OIC-02 OMB-01 PA-02 PM-05 PRS-01 SP-02 SS-15  
TRSE-00 NSC-05 /082 W  
-----002787 201915Z /41

O R 201814Z JUL 77  
FM USDEL MBFR VIENNA  
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2303  
SECDEF WASHDC IMMEDIATE  
USIA WASHDC IMMEDIATE  
INFO USMISSION NATO  
AMEMBASSY BONN  
AMEMBASSY LONDON  
USNMR SHAPE  
USCINCEUR

UNCLAS SECTION 1 OF 2 MBFR VIENNA 0424

STATE FOR ACDA JOHN NEWHOUSE

USIA FOR IEU COHEN AND IPS/PE

E.O. 11652: N/A  
TAGS: PARM, NATO  
SUBJ: MBFR NEGOTIATIONS: END OF ROUND XII PRESS STATEMENT TO  
BE GIVEN BY NETHERLANDS AMBASSADOR DE VOS JULY 21, 1977

REF: MBFR VIENNA 0418

FOLLOWING IS TEXT OF STATEMENT FOR JULY 21 WIRELESS FILE  
"EMBARGO UNTIL 1300 GMT JULY 21". PRESS STATEMENT BY  
AMBASSADOR WILLEM DE VOS:

PRESS CONFERENCE STATEMENT BY AMBASSADOR W. DE VOS VAN  
STEENWIJK ON BEHALF OF THE WESTERN PARTICIPANTS IN THE  
UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

PAGE 02 MBFR V 00424 01 OF 02 201901Z

MBFR NEGOTIATIONS

IN MY STATEMENT TODAY, I WOULD LIKE TO SUMMARIZE BRIEFLY  
WHERE, IN THE WESTERN VIEW, THESE NEGOTIATIONS STAND AT THE  
END OF THIS ROUND.

WESTERN AND EASTERN REPRESENTATIVES ARE CONTINUING THE

DATA DISCUSSIONS WHICH WERE BEGUN DURING THE LAST ROUND WITH THE PURPOSE OF CLARIFYING THE DISCREPANCY BETWEEN EASTERN AND WESTERN FIGURES ON EASTERN MILITARY MANPOWER IN THE AREA.

THE FACT THAT THESE DISCUSSIONS ARE BEING CONDUCTED IN A BUSINESSLIKE WAY IS A POSITIVE ELEMENT. BOTH SIDES RECOGNIZE THE NECESSITY OF REACHING AGREEMENT ON THE TOTAL NUMBER OF ACTIVE DUTY MILITARY PERSONNEL WHICH EACH SIDE HAS IN THE AREA AS A PREREQUISITE FOR ANY REDUCTION AGREEMENT.

HOWEVER, THE DISCUSSIONS HAVE NOT YET BROUGHT TO LIGHT THE REASONS FOR THIS DISCREPANCY. WESTERN FIGURES SHOW THAT EASTERN ACTIVE DUTY MILITARY PERSONNEL IN THE AREA GREATLY OUTNUMBER THOSE OF THE WEST. WE DO NOT ACCEPT THE EASTERN CONTENTION THAT THERE IS APPROXIMATE EQUALITY IN THE MILITARY MANPOWER OF THE TWO SIDES IN THE AREA. ACCORDINGLY, THE REASONS FOR THE DISCREPANCY MUST BE CLARIFIED. IN A SITUATION WHERE THERE IS DISAGREEMENT ON THESE DATA, THERE CAN BE, OF COURSE, NO AGREED BASIS FOR CALCULATING THE SIZE OF REDUCTIONS OR THE LEVEL OF RESULTING LIMITATIONS.

IN ORDER TO FACILITATE OUR MUTUAL EFFORTS TO CLARIFY THE SOURCES OF THE DISCREPANCY, THE WESTERN PARTICIPANTS HAVE RECENTLY PROPOSED WAYS FOR MOVING THE DATA DISCUSSION FORWARD. GIVEN THE CONFIDENTIALITY OF THESE TALKS, I CANNOT GIVE DETAILS.

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

PAGE 03 MBFR V 00424 01 OF 02 201901Z

TURNING TO OTHER AREAS OF THESE NEGOTIATIONS, THE PRINCIPAL WESTERN OBJECTIVE REMAINS THE ACHIEVEMENT OF APPROXIMATE PARITY IN GROUND FORCES, TO BE REACHED BY REDUCTIONS TO A COMMON COLLECTIVE CEILING IN GROUND FORCE MANPOWER AND BY SUBSTANTIAL REDUCTION OF THE LARGE EASTERN SUPERIORITY IN MAIN BATTLE TANKS.

IN DECEMBER 1975, THE WEST PUT FORWARD ADDITIONAL PROPOSALS OF MAJOR MILITARY SIGNIFICANCE. TO THE REDUCTIONS AND LIMITATIONS IT HAD PREVIOUSLY OFFERED TO UNDERTAKE, THE WEST ADDED US NUCLEAR REDUCTIONS WHICH AMOUNT TO A SUBSTANTIAL PORTION OF NATO'S NUCLEAR CAPABILITY IN THE AREA. AT THE SAME TIME, THE WEST ALSO PROPOSED TO INCLUDE AIR FORCE MANPOWER UNDER A COMBINED COMMON COLLECTIVE CEILING.

THE WEST'S DECEMBER 1975 MOVE WAS UNQUESTIONABLY THE MOST IMPORTANT ONE MADE BY EITHER SIDE SINCE EAST AND WEST PUT DOWN THEIR ORIGINAL PROPOSALS IN NOVEMBER 1973.

HOWEVER, SINCE DECEMBER 1975, THERE HAS BEEN NO COMMENSURATE MOVE FROM THE EAST. THE EASTERN PROPOSAL OF FEBRUARY 1976 OFFERED NO CHANGE IN THE EASTERN APPROACH TO REDUCTIONS. THEREFORE, IT CANNOT BE REGARDED AS AN ANSWER TO THE DECEMBER

1975 WESTERN PROPOSAL. IN SHORT, THE WEST IS STILL WAITING FOR  
THDDTO GIVE A POSITIVE AND SERIOUS RESPONSE TO THESE  
WESTERN PROPOSALS.

THE WEST HAS PROPOSED AN OUTCOME OF GENUINE PARITY IN  
MILITARY MANPOWER. EASTERN REPRESENTATIVES CLAIM THAT  
APPROXIMATE PARITY IN MILITARY MANPOWER ALREADY EXISTS AND  
THAT THEREFORE EQUAL PERCENTAGE REDUCTIONS WOULD, ON THE BASIS  
OF THEIR FIGURES, RESULT IN A RELATIONSHIP OF APPROXIMATE  
EQUALITY IN MILITARY PERSONNEL. HOWEVER, WESTERN FIGURES SHOW  
THAT THE EAST HAS A LARGE NUMERICAL SUPERIORITY IN MILITARY  
MANPOWER. CONSEQUENTLY, THIS EASTERN APPROACH WOULD RESULT IN  
AN OUTCOME WHICH WOULD MERELY MASK THE CONTINUED EXISTENCE  
OF EASTERN SUPERIORITY IN MILITARY MANPOWER.  
UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

PAGE 04 MBFR V 00424 01 OF 02 201901Z

ON THE ISSUE OF ARMAMENTS REDUCTIONS, THE EAST CONTINUES  
TO INSIST ON AN APPROACH OF REDUCING AND LIMITING ALL ARMAMENTS  
ON AN EQUAL PERCENTAGE BASIS. THIS APPROACH WOULD CONTRACTUALIZE  
THE EAST'S VERY LARGE NUMERICAL ADVANTAGES IN MOST TYPES OF  
MAJOR ARMAMENTS IN THE AREA. THE WEST FOR ITS PART HAS PROPOSED  
THE CONCEPT OF A SELECTIVE APPROACH TO ARMAMENTS REDUCTIONS  
WHICH WOULD AVOID THE CONTRACTUALIZATION OF DISPARITIES. WE  
CONSIDER THAT THIS CONCEPT REPRESENTS A PRACTICAL AND EQUITABLE  
WAY OF DEALING WITH THIS ISSUE.

UNCLASSIFIED

NNN

UNCLASSIFIED

PAGE 01 MBFR V 00424 02 OF 02 201917Z  
ACTION ACDA-10

INFO OCT-01 EUR-12 ISO-00 ACDE-00 SSO-00 NSCE-00  
INRE-00 CIAE-00 H-02 INR-07 IO-14 L-03 NSAE-00  
OIC-02 OMB-01 PA-02 PM-05 PRS-01 SP-02 SS-15  
TRSE-00 DODE-00 NSC-05 /082 W  
-----003085 201919Z /41

O R 201814Z JUL 77

FM USDEL MBFR VIENNA

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2304

SECDEF WASHDC IMMEDIATE

USIA WASHDC IMMEDIATE

INFO USMISSION NATO  
AMEMBASSY BONN  
AMEMBASSY LONDON  
USNMR SHAPE  
USCINCEUR

UNCLAS SECTION 2 OF 2 MBFR VIENNA 0424

STATE FOR ACDA JOHN NEWHOUSE

USIA FOR IEU COHEN AND IPS/PE

AS REGARDS THE LIMITATIONS ON MILITARY MANPOWER THAT WOULD RESULT FROM AN AGREEMENT, EASTERN PARTICIPANTS STILL REFUSE TO ACKNOWLEDGE THAT THE REALISTIC AND EQUITABLE SOLUTION TO THIS COMPLEX PROBLEM IS THE ONE THE WEST HAS PROPOSED--NAMELY, THAT THERE SHOULD BE A COLLECTIVE CEILING ON THE MANPOWER OF EACH SIDE, ALONG WITH A LIMITATION ON THE MANPOWER WHICH THE TWO WORLD MILITARY POWERS, THE US AND THE USSR, CAN MAINTAIN IN THE AREA. THIS SOLUTION IS ESSENTIAL TO PRESERVE NATO'S COLLECTIVE DEFENSE SYSTEM AND IS REQUIRED TO AVOID PREJUDICE TO THE FUTURE ORGANIZATION OF WESTERN EUROPEAN DEFENSE. IT ALSO REFLECTS THE UNIQUE MILITARY CAPABILITIES AND WORLD STATUS OF THE US AND USSR. IT TAKES INTO ACCOUNT THE FACT THAT ANY LIMITATION WILL FALL MORE HEAVILY ON THOSE PARTICIPANTS WHO HAVE SUBSTANTIALLY ALL UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

PAGE 02 MBFR V 00424 02 OF 02 201917Z

OF THEIR FORCES INSIDE THE AREA THAN IT WILL ON THOSE WHO HAVE MOST OF THEIR FORCES OUTSIDE THE AREA AND WHO WILL BE LIMITED ONLY AS TO THE MANPOWER THEY MAY MAINTAIN IN THE AREA.

IN THIS RESPECT AS IN OTHERS, EASTERN PARTICIPANTS STILL HAVE NOT TAKEN INTO ACCOUNT THE FACTS OF GEOGRAPHY AND THE ADVANTAGES WHICH GEOGRAPHY CONFERS ON THE EAST THROUGH THE FACT THAT THE SOVIET UNION WITH ITS LARGE FORCES IS CONTINGUOUS TO THE REDUCTION AREA.

IN THEIR FEBRUARY 19 PROPOSAL, THE EASTERN PARTICIPANTS CLAIM TO HAVE MODIFIED THEIR ORIGINAL POSITION AS REGARDS THE SEQUENCE OF THE IMPLEMENTATION OF REDUCTIONS AND AS REGARDS PROVISION FOR TWO SEPARATE AGREEMENTS. HOWEVER, THE EAST IS STILL ASKING US TO ACCEPT FROM THE OUTSET ALL THE MAIN ELEMENTS OF ITS ORIGINAL INEQUITABLE AND UNREALISTIC REDUCTION APPROACH. IT CANNOT LOGICALLY CLAIM TO HAVE MOVED SIGNIFICANTLY TO MEET THE WESTERN POSITION ON PHASING WHEN IN THE FIRST PHASE AGREEMENT ALL DIRECT PARTICIPANTS, AND NOT ONLY THE US AND USSR, WOULD HAVE TO UNDERTAKE BINDING COMMITMENTS TO CARRY OUT REDUCTIONS OF THE TYPE PROPOSED IN THE EASTERN NOVEMBER 1973 PROPOSAL.

THE BASIC REASON FOR THE UNSATISFACTORY OVERALL SITUATION

IN THE WESTERN VIEW, IS THE EAST'S UNWILLINGNESS TO CHANGE ITS  
INEQUITABLE AND UNREALISTIC REDUCTION APPROACH.

DESPITE THESE NEGATIVE ASPECTS OF THE PAST ROUND, THE  
WESTERN PARTICIPANTS CONTINUE STRONGLY INTERESTED IN ADVANCING  
AN AGREEMENT. WE REMAIN CONVINCED THAT PROGRESS CAN BE MADE  
IF PARTICIPANTS CAN USE THE CONTINUING DATA DISCUSSION TO  
REACH AGREEMENT ON THE BASIC FACTS WITH REGARD TO THE STRENGTH  
OF MILITARY MANPOWER IN CENTRAL EUROPE. THIS ISSUE REMAINS  
AT THE HEART OF THESE NEGOTIATIONS.RESOR  
UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

PAGE 03 MBFR V 00424 02 OF 02 201917Z

UNCLASSIFIED

NNN

## Message Attributes

**Automatic Decaptioning:** X  
**Capture Date:** 01-Jan-1994 12:00:00 am  
**Channel Indicators:** n/a  
**Current Classification:** UNCLASSIFIED  
**Concepts:** DATA, NEGOTIATIONS, MUTUAL FORCE REDUCTIONS, PRESS RELEASES  
**Control Number:** n/a  
**Copy:** SINGLE  
**Sent Date:** 20-Jul-1977 12:00:00 am  
**Decaption Date:** 01-Jan-1960 12:00:00 am  
**Decaption Note:**  
**Disposition Action:** n/a  
**Disposition Approved on Date:**  
**Disposition Case Number:** n/a  
**Disposition Comment:**  
**Disposition Date:** 01-Jan-1960 12:00:00 am  
**Disposition Event:**  
**Disposition History:** n/a  
**Disposition Reason:**  
**Disposition Remarks:**  
**Document Number:** 1977MBFRV00424  
**Document Source:** CORE  
**Document Unique ID:** 00  
**Drafter:** n/a  
**Enclosure:** n/a  
**Executive Order:** N/A  
**Errors:** N/A  
**Expiration:**  
**Film Number:** D770258-0262  
**Format:** TEL  
**From:** MBFR VIENNA  
**Handling Restrictions:** n/a  
**Image Path:**  
**ISecure:** 1  
**Legacy Key:** link1977/newtext/t19770739/aaaabgzy.tel  
**Line Count:** 240  
**Litigation Code IDs:**  
**Litigation Codes:**  
**Litigation History:**  
**Locator:** TEXT ON-LINE, ON MICROFILM  
**Message ID:** a3210467-c288-dd11-92da-001cc4696bcc  
**Office:** ACTION ACDA  
**Original Classification:** UNCLASSIFIED  
**Original Handling Restrictions:** n/a  
**Original Previous Classification:** n/a  
**Original Previous Handling Restrictions:** n/a  
**Page Count:** 5  
**Previous Channel Indicators:** n/a  
**Previous Classification:** n/a  
**Previous Handling Restrictions:** n/a  
**Reference:** 77 MBFR VIENNA 418  
**Retention:** 0  
**Review Action:** RELEASED, APPROVED  
**Review Content Flags:**  
**Review Date:** 02-Feb-2005 12:00:00 am  
**Review Event:**  
**Review Exemptions:** n/a  
**Review Media Identifier:**  
**Review Release Date:** n/a  
**Review Release Event:** n/a  
**Review Transfer Date:**  
**Review Withdrawn Fields:** n/a  
**SAS ID:** 1805199  
**Secure:** OPEN  
**Status:** NATIVE  
**Subject:** MBFR NEGOTIATIONS: END OF ROUND XII PRESS STATEMENT TO BE GIVEN BY NETHERLANDS AMBASSADOR DE VOS JULY 21, 1977  
**TAGS:** PARM, NATO, MBFR, (DE VOS, WILLEM)  
**To:** STATE DOD  
**Type:** TE  
**vdkgvkey:** odbc://SAS/SAS.dbo.SAS\_Docs/a3210467-c288-dd11-92da-001cc4696bcc  
**Review Markings:**  
Margaret P. Grafeld  
Declassified/Released  
US Department of State  
EO Systematic Review  
22 May 2009  
**Markings:** Margaret P. Grafeld Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 22 May 2009